David Detmer

“Surely at least some of our logical principles … are far more evident and obvious to us than are any of the empirical generalizations we find in psychology, or in any other of the empirical sciences. Thus, to attempt to explain logic in terms of psychology is to explain the more certain by the less certain. It is, in short, to commit the fallacy of obscurum per obscurius.”

“If our aim is the objective truth, we can have a motivation and a reason for revising our epistemic norms whenever we have reason to think they aren’t helping us optimally to reach that goal, and we can have a sounds basis for criticizing others’ claims that we should adhere to the norms. But how can we have any of these things if the truth just is whatever follows from our epistemic norms?”

“In order to judge that something is not working, wouldn’t we have to know what it’s effects really are? … And surely some of our social practices cannot be judged to be “working” except by invoking the goal of objective truth. For example, to know whether or not the criminal justice system is working well, wouldn’t we have to know something about the accuracy of its results?”